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Commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) is a form of violence in which children, 
mainly girls and female adolescents, are reduced to sexual objects for rent. In this study, 
we argue that the concept of who is an exploiter must be broadened to include everyone 
who directly or indirectly benefits from CSEC. This paper is based on life stories of 10 
female residents from a shelter, which we call Casa Libertad (a fictitious name) in Mexico 
City, for female victims of violence. Researchers also used semi-structured interviews with 
experts on CSEC to examine the exploiters' profiles. The research challenges the social 
representation of all exploiters as members of criminal trafficking networks. Some of the 
girls did not have direct exploiters, but often acted on their own. Among the victims who 
had exploiters, relatives and acquaintances played a central role. Our data revealed that the 
Mexican State, which formally prevents exploitation and assists victims, also contributes 
by action by not enforcing CSEC existing laws. The State also does not provide sufficient 
services to victims and has in its ranks sex buyers and abusers. 
KEYWORDS 
Mexico; commercial sexual exploitation of children; child sexual abuse; human 
trafficking; institutional violence  
 
ICTIMS ARE EXPLOITED EVERY DAY in the global market of human traffick-
ing (International Labour Organization, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 
2014; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009); yet the exact num-
ber is unknown (Meshkovska, Siegel, Sutterheim, & Bos, 2015). Among trafficked 
persons, children and teenagers are especially vulnerable because they are ex-
ploited in the making of child sexual abuse images (child pornography), sold into 
sex tourism, and prostituted. Although adolescents and children of both sexes are 
exploited, girls and female adolescents seem to be victimized at a higher rate 
(Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, 2006; Comisión Interamer-
ican de Mujeres, Organización de Estados Americanos, Organización Internac-
ional para las Migraciones, Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, Instituto Nacional 
de Migración, 2006).  
V 
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Children and adolescents in Mexico are victims of trafficking and exploitation. 
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations, 2000), also known as the Pa-
lermo Protocol, defines trafficking in persons (TIP) as the  
“recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploi-
tation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.”  
Although traffickers exploit victims, some victims are exploited without the in-
tervention of a trafficker.1 The observable boundaries between trafficking involv-
ing a trafficker and the direct exploitation of a victim are often unclear.  
By some estimates, in Mexico, 16,000 to 20,000 children are sexually exploited 
every year (Azaola, 2000; U.S. Department of State, 2008). Nevertheless, the 
sources of data and methodology for such estimates are questionable. According 
to the Foundation Scelles (2014), this figure may be between 25,000 and 75,000. 
Regarding the trafficking of persons (TIP) in Mexico, “there are no exact official 
statistics on trafficking of women” (Acharya, 2017; p. 220). The War against Drugs 
(Guerra contra las Drogas), a policy initiated by President Calderón consisting of a 
military offensive against Mexico-based drug cartels, and a zero-tolerance drug use 
policy (Daly, Heinle, & Shrik, 2012; Pereyra, 2012) with the objective of guarantee-
ing public security (Chabat, 2010; Escalante, 2011), has been associated with an 
increase in trafficking in persons (mostly of female migrants in transit to the U.S.), 
due to a diversification of activities by drug cartels (Casillas, 2012; Pereyra, 2012).  
Published research on TIP and commercial sexual exploitation in Mexico is 
limited. It tends to relate to victims’ experiences with criminal and trafficking/ex-
ploitation networks (Azaola, 2000, 2006; Cacho, 2010; Pérez, 1995; Raymond, 
Hughes, & Gomez, 2010; Reyes, 2007), and does not differentiate among victims’ 
developmental stages (Acharya, 2008, 2010). In addition to criminal networks, 
other individuals participate in Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 
(CSEC), for instance individual traffickers, sex buyers, and business owners who 
passively allow children’s exploitation. These individuals have not received enough 
attention in current research about CSEC in Mexico, and often are not labeled as 
exploiters. However, exploiters are those who in some way, individually or collec-
tively, contribute to CSEC (End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Traf-
ficking of Children for Sexual Purposes International, 2012), regardless of whether 
they play an active or passive role in the exploitation.  
                                                        
1 According to Williamson and Prior (2009; p. 47), in the U.S. the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act, “helped to change the language of child sex trafficking in the U.S. (…) the act of manipulating 
a child into prostitution is now called child sex trafficking and those who were once pimps are now 
referred to as traffickers.” According to this perspective, both those involved in direct exploitation 
and those trafficking children are referred to as traffickers. 
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This small empirical study of girls and adolescent victims of sexual exploitation 
in Casa Libertad, a fictitious shelter in Mexico City that provides assistance to girls 
and teenage victims of violence, has three main objectives: a) to describe the dif-
ferent actors who in some way promote or facilitate CSEC; b) to study the role of 
the State in protecting children and adolescents from CSEC; and, c) to challenge 
stereotypes about CSEC in Mexico that link the phenomenon only with pimps and 
criminal trafficking networks. The underlying hypotheses are that there are both 
direct and indirect exploiters who profit from CSEC. Some of the direct exploiters 
tend to be from the girls’ inner social and family circles.  
The first section of this article addresses the phenomenon of violence against 
children and its manifestations, including CSEC. Next, it describes the protection 
offered by the Mexican State to victims of TIP and commercial sexual exploitation 
(CSE). The third section examines direct and indirect exploiters. The article re-
views the role that the Mexican State and nonprofit organizations play in prevent-
ing CSEC and assisting victims. Finally, it presents the conclusions and limitations.  
Child Sexual Exploitation as a Form of Violence against Children 
CSEC is an expression of violence against children and adolescents that has 
consequences for children’s mental and physical health. It damages their abilities 
to learn and socialize, undermines their growth as functional adults, and even leads 
to death (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, 2006). CSEC 
consists of sexual abuse in exchange for a payment in currency or goods, either for 
the exploited child or his/her exploiter. Payment in goods includes housing, food, 
clothes, drugs, medicines, and/or “protection” for the victim.  
CSEC is a form of sexual violence in which exploited children are systematically 
raped and sexually abused, mainly, but not only, by male adults. It can also be per-
petrated by an underage person who is significantly older than the victim, or holds 
power over the abused person. Victims of CSEC often suffer violence and extreme 
physical, sexual, and psychological abuse by exploiters (United Nations Interna-
tional Children’s Emergency Fund, & Inter-Parlamentary Union, 2005). In some 
cases, CSEC also includes other forms of aggression that further victimize children, 
such as beatings, threats, and/or abduction (Azaola, 2000). In others cases, exploi-
ters establish emotional ties with victims as a subtle form of control. This strategy 
can be as effective and harmful as physical violence or threats.  
While victims of CSEC are usually exploited by someone who profits from their 
bodies, this is not always the case. Some victims of CSEC have reported they are 
willing to exchange sex for money or other kinds of payment, while other people 
benefit from their exploitation. Since minors are not legally capable of making this 
“decision” and because they do so in contexts of poverty, violence, inequality, and 
exclusion, these girls and teenagers shall be considered victims of exploitation. In 
the case of adults, however, the definition of trafficking is “a battleground between 
those who consider it possible for sex work to be a voluntary choice and those who 
consider prostitution to always be forced” (Meshkovska et al., 2015, p. 382).  
Whether organized in criminal networks or not, sex traffickers and exploiters 
prey on the vulnerable. Their targets are often children and young women who, 
among other vulnerability factors, live in poverty, have been sexually abused 
(Acharya, 2010; Azaola, 2006; Carro & Treguear, 1997; Chase & Statham, 2005; 
Goldenberg et al., 2015; Negrete, 1998; Scoppetta Díaz & Rodríguez Cruz, 2006), 
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grew up in dysfunctional families (Pérez, 1995; Reyes, 2007; United Nations Inter-
national Children’s Emergency Fund, 2001), or have been victims of family vio-
lence (Estes & Weiner, 2001; Goldenberg et al., 2015; Reyes, 2007; United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund & Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2005). 
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Mexico and the Role of the State 
To protect trafficked and sexually exploited girls and adolescents, Mexico has 
committed to and enacted a number of international regulations such as the Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others (1949), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1981), the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1991) and its Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography (2000), the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Sanction, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women also known as 
Convention of Belém do Pará signed and ratified by Mexico (1995), as well as the 
UN Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Es-
pecially Women and Children – known as the Palermo Protocol ( 2000). Mexico 
agreed to protect minors (birth to 17 years of age) from all forms of sexual exploi-
tation and abuse, and to take appropriate measures to prevent and eradicate TIP.  
Regarding sexual exploitation of minors, the 1929 Mexican Federal Criminal 
Code included corruption of minors or aggravated procuring (lenocinio in Span-
ish) as a crime associated with prostitution. Currently it is defined as the sexual 
exploitation for profit of the body of a minor. Until 1999, TIP could only be prose-
cuted in Mexico through indirect legal charges such as corruption of minors or ag-
gravated procuring (Azaola, 2006).  
In 2007, the Law to Prevent and Punish Trafficking in Persons was enacted in 
Mexico. It was harshly criticized for its shortcomings and limitations, such as not 
considering all forms of TIP and exploitation, not aligning with international pre-
vention protocols, and lacking provisions regarding federal and state coordination 
efforts on crime prosecution. In 2009 the Special Commission against Trafficking 
in Persons was created in the Mexican Congress to draft a general law that would 
overcome the limitations of the 2007 law. The General Law on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Trafficking in Persons and the Protection and As-
sistance of Victims of These Crimes (General Trafficking Law) was enacted in 2012. 
The law sought to differentiate among trafficking ending when exploitation begins, 
slavery and other forms of exploitation (Coalición contra el Tráfico de Mujeres y 
Niñas en América Latina y el Caribe, 2016). In 2014, this law received minor re-
forms, which included the non-criminalization of victims for activities carried out 
while trafficked and/or exploited, and the recovery of prosecution powers by sub-
national governments.  
The major contribution of the General Trafficking Law is that trafficking is now 
considered a crime regardless of the victims’ consent. In addition, it takes into con-
sideration sexual and non-sexual exploitation such as slavery, servitude, labor ex-
ploitation, forced work or services, forced mendicancy, use of minors in criminal 
activities, illegal adoption of children, forced or servile marriage, organ trafficking, 
and illegal biomedical human experimentation. The General Trafficking Law pun-
ishes, among other activities, the exploitation of one or more individuals through 
prostitution, pornography, public or private sexual exhibitions, sexual tourism, or 
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any other paid sexual activity that has been driven by deceit, physical or psycho-
logical violence, abuse of power or of a vulnerable situation, serious harm, or threat 
of serious harm.  
Trafficking is a federal crime when at least one of the following situations oc-
curs: a) it was started, set up, or committed abroad and has or will in the future 
take place in Mexican territory, or vice versa; b) public authorities are involved; or 
c) it is perpetrated by organized crime (three or more associated individuals asso-
ciated temporarily or permanently to perpetrate crimes). FEVIMTRA (Special Fed-
eral Attorney’s Office for Violence against Women Crimes and Trafficking) inves-
tigates and assists victims in the first two situations. The last is responsibility of 
the UEITMPO (Unidad Especializada en Investigación de Tráfico de Menores, Per-
sonas y Órganos, Specialized Unit for the Investigation of Trafficking in Minors, 
Persons and Organs) at the SEIDO (Assistant Attorney General's Office for Special 
Investigations on Organized Crime). In all other cases, it is considered a state fel-
ony unless the General Attorney’s Office takes the case. Eighteen months elapsed 
between the enactment of the General Trafficking Law and the approval of its en-
abling regulations. However, as of November 2014, the laws in 142 of Mexico’s 32 
states did not comply with the General Trafficking Law (Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 2015). This is an obstacle for prosecuting non-federal traf-
ficking crimes and providing assistance to victims.  
In 2015, 578 individuals were prosecuted for both sexual and non-sexual TIP 
and exploitation crimes; 86 were convicted, a conviction rate consistent with other 
crimes in Mexico (U.S. Department of State, 2016) and prosecution rates from pre-
vious years (Rivas Rodríguez, Cendejas, Pérez Morales, & Díaz Sosa, 2015). Ac-
cording to governmental records, 1,814 victims were identified in 2015. Of these, 
43.2% experienced CSE; 26% forced labor; 21.1% forced mendicancy; 1% forced 
criminality; and 9% other forms of exploitation (U.S. Department of State, 2016). 
Other studies based on data from state agencies found that, from June 2012 to June 
2015, 93% of TIP and exploitation victims were female, and at least 26.5% were 
underage (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2016). At the federal level, 
the SEIDO reported that only around 45% of victims were female and 65% were 
underage (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2016). Detailed CSEC fig-
ures are not available because the National Census on Law-Enforcement does not 
tend to differentiate among different sexual crimes. For example, in the 2015 cen-
sus, sexual tourism, pornography, procuring, and forced labor exploitation of mi-
nors or persons with disabilities were grouped in the same category. The reliability 
of TIP and CSEC data is limited because “the anti-trafficking experts and people in 
prostitution reported officials often did not always differentiate between sex traf-
ficking victims and women in prostitution due in part to the overly broad anti-traf-
ficking law making victim identification statistics unreliable” (Acharya, 2017; p. 
225). 
The number of CSEC and TIP cases prosecuted in Mexico is low. Mexico faces 
a number of challenges that have been also identified in other countries. Difficul-
ties are associated with police inability to recognize CSEC cases, low victim report-
ing, complex definitions of trafficking that influence decisions about prosecution, 
trafficking techniques that prevent identification of victims, and victims’ lack of 
                                                        
2 Baja California Sur, Morelos, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Yucatán, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Mi-
choacán, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa and Tabasco. 
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cooperation (Nichols & Heil, 2014). Other obstacles that hinder law enforcement 
and victims’ protection include lack of human and material resources to provide 
proper assistance to victims, police corruption and, police participation in orga-
nized crime networks.  
This lack of resources is evidenced by the fact that as of 2013, only 11 of 32 
states had special investigation units for TIP crimes in State Attorney’s Offices 
(Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2013). Investigation of such cases in 
the remaining states was left to 219 state-level agencies specializing in sexual 
crimes, family violence crimes, and gender-based crimes, also responsible for in-
vestigating CSEC.  
As for the second obstacle, institutional violence has been documented in cases 
of police officers who offer “protection” to child victims in return for sex, judges 
who accept bribes and set exploiters free, and the complicity between some State 
authorities and trafficking networks or individual traffickers (Acharya, 2017; 
Azaola, 2006; Cacho, 2010; U.S. Department of State, 2016). There is evidence that 
government officials have accepted or extorted bribes (including sexual services), 
falsified victims’ identity documents, discouraged trafficking victims from report-
ing their victimization, and failed to report sex trafficking and exploitation in com-
mercial sex locations (U.S. Department of State, 2013). In sum, “governmental ac-
tions seem to be isolated, disorganized, lacking reliable diagnostics, and therefore, 
without objectives or specific actions for eradicating the problem (Rivas Rodríguez 
et al., 2015, p. 54).” 
Exploiters Indirectly or Directly Involved in Commercial Sexual Exploitation of 
Children 
In Mexico, the social representation of exploiters has historically been linked 
to pimps (padrote in Spanish). However, a variety of individuals take part in CSEC. 
There are direct exploiters such as pimps and sex buyers, as well as traffickers and 
often their underground networks composed by connectors, transporters, recruit-
ers, traders, “mommies,” groomers, bottoms, watchers, and wives-in-law that pro-
mote and perpetrate the abuse (for definitions see Chin & Finckenauer, 2011; Ter-
rito & Kirkham, 2010; Williamson & Prior, 2009). A recent study in two major U.S. 
cities, however, found that exploiters tend to act without these support networks 
(Marcus, Horning, Curtis, Sanson, & Thompson, 2014). There are also indirect ex-
ploiters such as civilians who promote or allow the abuse, public authorities, taxi 
drivers, hotel and motel owners, and merchants and businessmen who indirectly 
benefit from the sex trade (Muñoz-Echeverri, Noreña-Herrera, Rodríguez-Garzón, 
Ossa-Estrada, & Bastidas-Lopera, 2016). The latter tend not to be labeled as ex-
ploiters in previous research (Negrete, 1998; Nichols & Heil, 2014). 
Traffickers and Direct Exploiters 
The public perception is that exploiters are linked to criminal networks that, in 
addition to TIP and CSE, tend to be involved in other criminal activities, such as 
drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud, extortion, migrant smuggling and theft 
(CIM et al., 2006; Negrete, 1998; Raymond et al., 2010). Chin and Finckenauer 
(2011) have questioned this view because traffickers recruit their victims using a 
variety of methods. Methods may include seduction (developing a romantic rela-
tionship), fake job offers (as dancers, hostesses or models), finesse pimping (ma-
nipulating victims to make them believe they had to pay back kindnesses shown to 
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them through commercial sex), trading, and abduction, as well as guerrilla pimp-
ing (the exploitation of victims through the use of threat, intimidation and/or 
physical violence) (Kara, 2009; Meshkovska et al., 2015; Pinheiro, 2006; William-
son & Prior, 2009). The most common technique worldwide is based on seduction. 
A study of sex trafficking in the United States revealed that husbands and boy-
friends acted as pimps for 20% of international and 28% of U.S. female victims 
(Raymond et al., 2010).  
Men represent the great majority of traffickers and exploiters; however, 
women also appear to play a prominent role (Meshkovska et al., 2015; Negrete, 
2005; Torres Falcón, 2011). Traffickers and exploiters’ typical ploys are creative 
and ruthless, designed to trick, coerce, and win the confidence of potential victims. 
Very often these ruses involve promises of a better life, including marriage, em-
ployment and educational opportunities.  
Traffickers—exploiters as well as other people who benefit from CSEC—de-
velop socially acceptable excuses and justifications to diminish their responsibility. 
Copley (2013) identified several justifications for sex trafficking across heteroge-
neous contexts and cultures: a) denial of responsibility by attributing their crime 
to forces beyond their control (i.e. victims themselves or their parents decided to 
engage in prostitution); b) denial of injury arguments that minimize the extent of 
the harm caused to girls and women—some even contend that they are being 
helped by having employment provided for them; c) denial of the existence of a 
victim by dehumanizing exploited children, lessening the perceived wrongfulness 
of the crime, or claiming the harm was deserved; d) necessity, since exploiters be-
lieve that CSEC is necessary for reasons such as satisfying soldiers’ sexual desires; 
and, e) condemning the condemners, which involves exploiters blaming those who 
condemn and reject their actions. Those using this fifth justification, argue that sex 
trafficking persists due to corruption and the lack of governmental intervention, 
claiming that society itself is furthering the sex trade. Regardless of the argument, 
exploiters neutralize and justify the sexual exploitation of girls and teenagers in 
order to continue profiting from their bodies.  
The views that sex trafficking and CSE entail violence correspond to what Mar-
cus et al. (2014: 228) have labeled traditional narratives of exploitation arguing 
that these involve “[in the United States] pimp trickery, seduction, captivity, and 
brutality as the dominant or sole mode of recruitment and management.” They 
contested these views by providing empirical data derived from a large respond-
ent-driven sample in the specific case of street sexual exploitation in New York City 
and Atlantic City. They found that the vast majority of individuals studied (70% 
were minors) did not have a pimp, and those who did were not tied to this person 
through seduction, violence, addiction, control or debt. They found that vulnera-
bilities such as lack of education, unemployment, drug-addiction, housing prob-
lems, or abusive parental relationships kept them tied to their exploiter. It is plau-
sible, though, that CSEC occurring in non-street settings such as brothels might fit 
traditional narratives.  
Sex Buyers 
Although sex buyers of CSEC tend to remain invisible, they contribute as much 
to the sexual exploitation of girls and teenagers as traffickers (Kara, 2009; Ulloa, 
2011). In Mexico, CSEC consumers may lead lifestyles that approximate society’s 
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and seem to be “normal people (Cacho, 2010).” There are two types of CSEC con-
sumers: preferential (pedophiles and hebephiles) and situational sex buyers (see 
Azaola & Estes, 2003; Scoppetta Díaz & Rodríguez Cruz, 2006). In Mexico, some 
of them are child sex tourists who travel from affluent countries in North America 
or Europe, to have sex with children and/or teenagers (Azaola, 2000, 2006; Risley, 
2010; Scoppetta Díaz & Rodríguez Cruz, 2006). Most sex tourists are adult males, 
though there are a small number of women (Azaola, 2000). Sometimes these trav-
elers rationalize their behavior by assuming it is culturally acceptable (Copley, 
2013).  
Sex buyers share traffickers’ and exploiters’ arguments justifying CSEC. Many 
of them do not consider themselves to be abusers. Instead, they find rationaliza-
tions such as telling themselves that the children voluntarily engaged in prostitu-
tion; that the natives of tourist spots are less sexually repressed than westerners; 
that children gain “sexual experience” at a very early age; and that far from exploit-
ing, they are “employing” children in need (United Nations International Chil-
dren’s Emergency Fund, 2001).  
Indirect Exploiters  
 There are people who promote CSEC and indirectly profit from it, such as hotel 
owners or managers, taxi drivers that promote and advertise girls’ sexual “ser-
vices,” waitresses, valet parking attendants, hostesses, security guards, peddlers, 
drug dealers, tourism entrepreneurs, inspectors, and restaurant, brothel, spa, and 
bar owners (Azaola, 2000; Muñoz-Echeverri et al., 2016; Reyes, 2007). These in-
dividuals are indirect exploiters since they allow, tolerate, and benefit from chil-
dren’s sexual exploitation.  
METHOD 
In order to describe the different actors who in some way promote or facilitate 
CSEC in Mexico, and to study the views of expert informants regarding the role of 
the State in protecting children and adolescents from CSEC, we interviewed key 
informants and reconstructed the life stories of girls living at a nonprofit shelter 
for female victims of violence in Mexico City.  
The Life Stories of Survivors of CSEC 
Victims and survivors of CSEC are members of hidden populations, “special 
populations that cannot be studied using standard sampling and estimation tech-
niques” (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004:195). Victims of TIP and CSEC have been 
studied through different sampling methods: snowball or chain referral (Acharya, 
2015), respondent-driven (Marcus et al., 2012), convenience (Chin & Finckenauer, 
2011), a mix of simulated clients and snowball (Acharya, 2010), target samples 
(Goldenberg et al., 2015) and samples drawn from institutions (Williamson & 
Prior, 2009). In this research, we examined 10 identified cases of CSEC survivors 
sheltered in a not-for-profit institution in Mexico City.  
Recruitment 
We identified and contacted seven not-for-profit organizations working with 
CSEC and TIP survivors in Mexico City. Four of these organizations shelter and 
deliver services to victims of other crimes. We sent letters explaining our interest 
in working voluntarily in the institution and collecting research data. We followed 
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up with emails and phone calls. One organization agreed to participate in the 
study: Casa Libertad (fictitious name). Casa Libertad is located in one of the most 
violent and dangerous neighborhoods in Mexico City. Founded in 1994, Casa Lib-
ertad shelters about 60 girls. They have suffered, among other forms of abuse, do-
mestic violence, abandonment, homelessness, TIP, and CSEC. Casa Libertad is 
supported by donations from individuals and companies and public funding.  
Consent, Confidentiality, and Anonymity 
Casa Libertad’s founder and director provided institutional consent for us to 
examine their files and conduct ethnographic research regarding the functioning 
of the institution, as well as consent to interact with the sheltered girls. This strat-
egy avoided ethical dilemmas about researchers’ need to report CSEC cases (Allen, 
2009) because subjects were already receiving assistance and protection.  
We guaranteed the founder and director of Casa Libertad that data would only 
be used for research purposes and that the identities of the girls would be kept 
confidential and anonymous, a common standard in participant observation (Mu-
sante (DeWalt), 2014). The director requested that we not interview the girls and 
adolescents to avoid re-victimization and uncertainty about who should provide 
consent for an interview. She agreed that one of the authors would conduct partic-
ipant observation while working in Casa Libertad as a volunteer assisting person-
nel in the social work department and organizing cultural and handcraft work-
shops for the girls.  
This participant/volunteer role is appropriate when conducting research in un-
derstaffed institutions that rely on volunteer and community service work to carry 
out their daily activities. Access to the institution and information was exchanged 
for volunteer work, which resulted in greater opportunities to complement, com-
pare and contrast information to be used to reconstruct the life histories of the girls 
and adolescents. In this context, the volunteer work is interpreted as a means to 
compensate researched subject or institutions with service (Abebe, 2009). Apply-
ing Grenier's (2000, cited in Abebe, 2009: 461) argument to institutions rather 
than communities in developing countries “the researcher can’t really expect to go 
into local communities [organizations and institutions] and just take. If a person 
is going to do research, something has to be given back.” Therefore, there is reci-
procity between researcher and institution with each gaining something from the 
experience (Corbin & Morse, 2003; Musante (DeWalt), 2014).  
Data from Casa Libertad 
We identified 10 survivors of CSEC sheltered in Casa Libertad from January 
2012 to December 2013 and reconstructed their life stories (the names of the girls 
are pseudonyms) using data from three different sources: a) participant observa-
tion by one of the authors from December 2012 to February 2013, during which 
more than 100 pages of written observation notes were generated and informal 
conversations with personnel were recorded in a fieldwork diary; b) information 
available in the shelter’s database and printed file records (including police and 
social services reports and information gathered by personnel at Casa Libertad), 
which was recorded in a notebook; and c) informal conversations with female res-
idents in which their experiences of CSEC emerged spontaneously, which were also 
recorded in a fieldwork diary.  
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For example, one of the authors organized a cultural trip to Frida Kahlo’s mu-
seum with a group of adolescents. On her way back to Casa Libertad, she engaged 
in a two-hour conversation with one of the residents who disclosed that she had 
been on drugs for six years and had engaged “voluntarily” in prostitution to pay for 
drugs. The author also escorted another girl weekly to a not-for-profit organization 
providing assistance to rape victims. During the time they spent together, she dis-
closed that her father had raped her and that she was involved in CSEC. As Mu-
sante (DeWalt) argues, field notes are the primary method of capturing data from 
participant observation, resulting in a “product constructed by the researcher” 
(Musante (DeWalt), 2014: 276) because they are simultaneously data and analysis. 
Information in the fieldwork diary comprised sociodemographic and contextual 
data; information about the girls’ CSEC experiences and consequences; and the 
interactions among the girls and between them and Casa Libertad’s staff (all these 
topics were included in the observation guide).  
These three sources of complementary data enabled us to reconstruct 10 life 
stories (unit of analysis). The contribution of each source of data to the life stories 
is heterogeneous and varies across cases. These life stories allowed us to identify 
the victims’ exploiters’ profiles and modus operandi, and to examine the role of 
governmental institutions in victim protection and/or further victimization. It is 
plausible that Casa Libertad sheltered more CSEC survivors, but they were not 
identified through our data gathering strategy.  
Interviews with Expert Key Informants 
Simultaneously, we conducted seven semi-structured interviews with key ex-
perts in CSEC from different public institutions (FEVIMTRA and the State Prose-
cutor’s Office for Trafficking in Persons), directors or/and founders of four not-
for-profit organizations providing services to victims and lobbying for the enact-
ment of legislation. We also requested six additional interviews with experts in 
other not-for-profit organizations as well as in health, public security and social 
services agencies. However, we were not able to interview these experts because 
they did not answer our emails, letters and calls, or they did not set a date for an 
interview. 
The interviewed individuals were selected because of their knowledge and in-
volvement with TIP victims and CSEC, their role in the institution and their im-
partiality (Tremblay, 1959). We asked them questions regarding how victims of 
CSEC reach nonprofit organizations and governmental institutions; what types of 
services are delivered to victims of CSEC; prevention efforts of governmental and 
nonprofit organizations; obstacles and facilitators for the prevention of CSEC and 
assistance to victims; the role of the Mexican State in protecting children and ado-
lescents; factors associated with the persistence of CSE; and profiles of victims and 
perpetrators of CSEC. Each interview lasted 40 minutes to 1.5 hours and all of them 
were transcribed by one of the authors.  
Analytical Approaches 
The qualitative data (notes from the fieldwork diary based on observation, con-
versations with the shelter’s personnel, interactions with the female residents, re-
vision of both the record files and shelter database), were used both to obtain so-
ciodemographic information and to reconstruct their life stories around their ex-
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periences of CSEC. These were analyzed for themes by both authors seeking infor-
mation about exploiters, techniques used to exploit children and female adoles-
cents, protection, and victimization. We included in the results section extracts of 
the reconstructed life histories and report files.  
We performed an essentialist or realist inductive thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) of semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants to ex-
amine their own views on the role of the State in protecting children and adoles-
cents from CSEC. In general, we followed the analytical steps proposed by Braun 
and Clarke (2006): first we transcribed the data, read the transcriptions and man-
ually coded the interviews. We developed descriptive semantic codes that identi-
fied governmental actions (prevention of CSEC and assistance of victims), and ex-
perts’ assessment of the strengths, challenges, and limitations of such actions. It 
means that the themes were identified “within the explicit or surface meanings of 
the data.” Some of the codes were informed by the question asked, and some were 
derived from analysis of the interviews. We classified the different codes into po-
tential themes based on whether they captured relevant information regarding the 
research question, and reviewed them; and finally, we defined, described, and 
named these themes.  
RESULTS 
Figure 1 presents information regarding the experience of CSEC by girls and 
adolescents of Casa Libertad. Someone directly profited from the sexual exploita-
tion of eight of the 10 identified victims of CSEC. In the remaining two cases, there 
was not a direct exploiter (Maria and Selene). As shown in Figure 1, four of the 8 
girls who experienced direct exploitation were exploited by non-relative males or 




















Figure 1: Those Who Directly Profited from the Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation 
11
Frias and Gómez-Zaldívar: Child and Adolescent Commercial Sexual Exploitation in Mexico
Published by DigitalCommons@URI, 2017
  
Four of the girls were exploited by a relative (her own mother in the case of 
Eugenia) or someone their parents left the girls with and who was known as a po-
tential threat (Tina, Margarita, and Regina.  
Table 1 shows that 6 out of the 10 girls experienced child sexual abuse (CSA) 
before their CSEC, and therefore had multiple victimizations. The girls who expe-
rienced CSA suffered from CSEC at a younger age than those that did not experi-
ence it. Three of the girls were illiterate and the rest had dropped out of school—
some as a consequence of the CSEC and others before its occurrence. An equal 
number lived in urban areas and in rural areas. All the girls of Casa Libertad were 
poor, as are 53.8% of the population under 18 years old in Mexico (Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, & United Nations Inter-
national Children’s Emergency Fund, 2013).  
Seven of the girls were from Mexico City—where Casa Libertad is located—or 
the surrounding states: Morelos, and the State of Mexico. Another girl came from 
the northern state of Coahuila, and one each came from Chiapas and Oaxaca—
states with a high percentage of indigenous population. These last were respec-
tively, Karen and Concepcion (not their real names). They were taken to Casa Lib-
ertad from federal institutions, which may mean that their exploitation occurred 
in a foreign country; that public authorities were involved; or that organized crime 
was involved in their victimization. Karen and Concepción were the only two girls 
exploited by a husband/boyfriend, who presumably belonged to trafficking crime 
networks. 
The girls were referred to Casa Libertad by a variety of institutions: municipal- 
and state-level family and child protection agencies (DIF- Defensa Integral de la 
Familia 3 ), State and Federal Attorneys’ offices and federal agencies such as 
PROVICTIMA, predecessor of the Executive Commission for the Assistance of Vic-
tims (CEAV).  
Indirect Exploiters  
For some victims, the absence of a direct exploiter does not imply that other 
individuals are not profiting from their apparently “voluntary” sexual exploitation. 
Maria’s and Selene’s cases (not their real names) illustrate how girls and teenagers 
may be victims of CSEC without a direct exploiter in the context of social inequality 
and vulnerability. In these cases, different actors such as taxi drivers, hotel owners, 
drug dealers, pornographers, tourism entrepreneurs, or bar, spa, and brothel own-
ers profited from their exploitation.  
According to the printed records, Maria arrived at Casa Libertad when she was 
17. Her father was an alcoholic and her mother died of a drug overdose when she 
was 10. That same year, her father was sentenced to prison for theft. Two years 
later, Maria became addicted to paint thinner and other drugs and dropped out of 
school. At age 14 she engaged in prostitution to fund her addiction. In an informal 
conversation, Maria disclosed that she was taken by a friend to Casa Libertad for 
the first time when she was 15. She mentioned that after one month, she ran away 
                                                        
3 Defensa Integral de la Familia (DIF) provides social services. 
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Attorney’s Office of Mexico (Procuraduría General de la República). 
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and returned to prostitution. She began stealing and spent a month at a juvenile 
detention center. When she came out, her strong addiction to drugs and her low 
self-esteem led her back into prostitution. She even became an exploiter, according 
to her testimony: She prostituted other girls. 
Selene (not her real name) arrived at Casa Libertad at the age of 10. Selene’s 
files indicate that at seven, she had already been raped by her father, who was later 
convicted for her rape. Selene’s mother worked all day, and her brother forced Se-
lene to work as a domestic worker for their neighbors. Selene also received money 
for sex. A copy of her testimony in the State’s Attorney’s Office’s records included 
in Casa Libertad’s files states, “I let other men do what my daddy did to me. But it 
does not hurt me anymore. They give me money if I have sex with them. I have 
done it with many.”  
Direct Exploiters 
Social representation of CSEC exploiters often links them to mafias, criminal 
networks, and organized crime. This may have been the case for Concepción and 
Karen (not their real names), who were rescued by the federal government. Never-
theless, in the cases of half of the girls at Casa Libertad, the exploiters who directly 
benefited from the victims’ CSEC belonged to the victim’s inner circle—their moth-
ers or other women who were supposed to supervise and take care of the girls. Two 
of the girls were exploited by non-relatives. The direct exploiters of the girls of Casa 
Libertad were both men and women; four of them were women and three of these 
women were themselves engaged in prostitution. The complexity of the category 
“exploiter” is further illustrated by the case of Maria (not her real name). She was 
not only a victim of sexual exploitation, but she also turned into an exploiter and 
prostituted other girls.  
Eugenia’s (not her real name) case illustrates how perpetrators may be rela-
tives. According to Casa Libertad’s records and database, Eugenia arrived there 
when she was 13. Her mother was engaged in prostitution and was often away from 
home for several days at a time, leaving Eugenia in charge of her younger siblings. 
According to a report from the Attorney’s Office (June 2012), Eugenia’s mother 
forced her and her siblings to watch her having sex. Eugenia’s mother started pros-
tituting Eugenia’s older sister, Esther, at age 14. Esther (not her real name) was 
sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend, became pregnant and had an abortion. 
She ran away from home. Eugenia was also sexually molested by this man, and 
barely escaped being raped. Eugenia’s mother decided to prostitute Eugenia and 
took her to a bar where she was forced into prostitution.  
The case of another girl, Tina (not her real name), also challenges the social 
construction of CSEC’s exploiters as members of trafficking and criminal networks. 
By age 13, Tina had already been pregnant four times as a result of sexual exploi-
tation. It began four years earlier when she was raped by her drunken uncle. Then, 
according to Tina’s records, her mother made an economic arrangement with the 
madam of a cantina (bar) to allow Tina to work as a waitress. The madam forced 
her to have sex with sex buyers. Despite not being the direct exploiter, Tina’s 
mother received money for her daughter’s work and exploitation. Her mother was 
aware that cantina girls had sex with men, and was thus an accomplice in her ex-
ploitation. According to Tina’s records, by age 13 she had already had two abor-
tions, a dilation and curettage procedure due to death of the fetus, and gave birth 
to one baby whose whereabouts remain unknown. 
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Similarly, Regina (not her real name) arrived at Casa Libertad at age 14. She 
was illiterate. She reported during informal conversations with one of the authors 
being systematically raped and beaten by her father since the age of two. Despite 
her father’s constant threats to kill her, Regina managed to tell her mother about 
the abuse. Regina’s mother did not believe her. When Regina’s mother became 
sick, she sent Regina and her siblings to live with an acquaintance who beat them. 
This woman prostituted Regina and her sister at a cabaret. According to Regina’s 
records, she became pregnant by a sex buyer and when she gave birth, the woman 
took the baby from her. She has not seen the baby since. Regina’s parents are cur-
rently in prison.  
Other exploiters apparently act independently of an organized group, such as 
Catalina’s trafficker. Catalina (not her real name) was from the northern state of 
Coahuila, and her exploiter was a taxi driver. Catalina’s records and Casa Libertad’s 
database revealed she was sexually abused by her father for two years. At age 14 
she was drugged, raped, and forced into prostitution by a taxi driver who threat-
ened to kill Catalina’s mother if she were to say anything or if she resisted.  
Some traffickers act as boyfriends to their future victims, and may even marry 
them in order to take them out of their hometowns and exploit them in unfamiliar 
cities. This was the case for both Karen and Concepcion (not their real names), who 
were born in two of the poorest states of Mexico, and were the only two identified 
cases of CSEC perpetrated by a network. They both fell in love with men who be-
came their exploiters. Karen’s records state that she was born in the southern state 
of Chiapas and arrived at Casa Libertad when she was 22 years old. Around the age 
of 17, Karen was sexually exploited by her boyfriend—who was the father of her 
twin girls—and her boyfriend’s father. Karen and her daughters were referred to 
Casa Libertad by a federal agency.  
Concepcion, who was born in the state of Oaxaca, arrived at Casa Libertad at 
age 17. At 15, she married a 17-year-old boy, who one month into their marriage 
“asked” her to engage in prostitution due to economic necessity. For a year and a 
half, Concepcion “agreed” to have sex for money. Her husband’s brother also ex-
ploited his own wife, which suggests TIP and CSE was a family business. Concep-
cion’s sister-in-law’s case reached a federal agency, and she let them know about 
Concepcion’s exploitation. This led to her being rescued later. Concepcion said she 
had agreed to prostitute herself and was thus never forced into anything. Casa Lib-
ertad’s staff mentioned she probably experienced manipulation that was less than 
physical violence. Although Concepcion’s case might seem voluntary, legally it is 
not, since the General Trafficking Law states that the consent of the victim is not a 
cause for excluding the criminal responsibility of perpetrators.  
The Sex Buyers 
Buyers of CSEC are usually national or foreign exploiters who pay to have sex 
with children. In Casa Libertad, all the girls were exploited in Mexico, but both 
national and foreign sex buyers were identified. For example, Catalina’s clients 
were mainly from the U.S., as revealed by Casa Libertad’s legal advisor: 
“This guy [taxi driver] began by giving her small amounts of drugs to get 
her addicted. I guess the girl was around 14 [years old] (…) Then, he con-
tacts Americans who cross the border and sets a date. It was not in a hotel, 
it was in a non-occupied brand-new building complex. (…) He took the girl 
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there, she was already on drugs, and she was the object of a mass rape. I 
mean, several men [had sex] with her. It lasted for a long time.”  
When victims of CSEC are directly exploited, as in the cases of Catalina, Regina, 
Concepción or Karen, all or most of the payment is kept by the exploiter. In cases 
of indirect exploitation, children receive the payment themselves. However, in 
such cases there are also rapists who pretend to be buyers and force their victims 
to have sex without payment. According to Maria’s reconstructed life story, she was 
constantly battered and raped by sex buyers; on several occasions they even tried 
to kill her. In an informal conversation, she said: 
“When I arrived at Casa Libertad for the first time, I had only been raped 
once. By the second time I arrived, I had gone through 10.” 
Her last rape occurred after she had taken drugs and stood on a street looking 
for sex buyers. When a taxi stopped, Maria got in, looked at the mirror, and imme-
diately recognized the driver; he had already raped her before. She tried to get out 
of the car, but the taxi driver raped her again. He dropped Maria far away from 
where he picked her up, where some people helped her and paid for a taxi. She 
asked the taxi driver to take her to the same street where she had earlier met the 
first taxi driver. 
There is no specific profile for sex buyers in Mexico. They can be of any age or 
belong to any socioeconomic strata. The buyers of the sheltered girls were not al-
ways adults. According to Selene’s official records, by the age of 10, she had already 
had sexual intercourse with eight males; four of them were 15 or 16 years old. One 
of these men was her cousin. The ages of the remaining four were not included in 
Selene’s records, but at least four out of the eight sex buyers were underage. In 
exchange, Selene received between 25 pesos and 200 pesos (around 1.6 and 13.3 
U.S. dollars).  
Public authorities, police, and State attorney’s agents are also consumers. Ma-
ria’s records show that, despite not being directly exploited by a trafficker, she had 
to have sex with police officers who intimidated and threatened her with arrest. At 
times, they paid her with money or drugs they had taken from other people (pay-
ment in goods); other times she received no payment at all. With the data available 
from the girls of Casa Libertad, we do not have direct evidence that any of the other 
girls had law enforcement agents and civil servants as sex buyers. However, the 
experts interviewed recounted many cases in which exploiters were law enforce-
ment agents or civil servants. The Attorney General of FEVIMTRA revealed that 
some victims of CSEC had state-level civil servants as sex buyers.  
“Sometimes the victim tells me: ‘You know what? When I was being ex-
ploited, high ranking public authorities came. If I press charges in my 
state… I put myself at risk.’” 
The following testimony from a victim of CSEC exploited for three years since 
the age of 13 is also revelatory:  
“Public authorities are accomplices. We went [with other victims of CSEC] 
to their parties. It was obvious that we were underage. We were forced to 
be their sexual entertainment against our will. These people do not have 
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moral authority at all” (see Special Commission Against Trafficking in Per-
sons 2011, p. 30). 
According to the U.S. Department of State, “despite persistent reports of ex-
tensive official complicity, authorities did not report any prosecutions or convic-
tions of government employees complicit of trafficking in 2015 (U.S. Department 
of State, 2016; p. 268).” In fact, not a single civil servant or authority has been 
convicted since 2010. 
The Negligent Protective State 
Experts’ views regarding the commitment of the State to battle CSEC and TIP 
are divided. Some state employees argue that the government is willing to act but 
that the phenomenon is complex. In contrast, others believe that the approval of 
legislation on trafficking without allocating resources for prevention, assistance, 
or prosecution reflects the State’s negligence. In addition, they agree that TIP in 
general and CSEC in particular exists due to corruption, impunity for perpetrators, 
and complicity between different State actors, such as police officers, public pros-
ecutors, judges, and society’s tolerance and ignorance.  
CSEC might be regarded as a manifestation of the State’s institutional violence 
because the State has the responsibility for protecting and ensuring children’s 
rights. Institutional violence, according the General Law on Women’s Access to a 
Life Free of Violence, enacted in 2007, can be exercised through action (direct vic-
timization, re-victimization, corruption, complicity) but also through omission 
(impunity for exploiters and inadequate or lack of public policy).  
Institutional Violence by Action 
In the views of all governmental (n=2) and non-governmental experts (n=5) 
that we interviewed, corruption of public authorities and their complicity with traf-
fickers and exploiters obstructs law enforcement and therefore CSEC eradication. 
Casa Libertad’s legal advisor highlighted that some personnel from government 
agencies profited from the sex trade by demanding money in exchange for not con-
ducting raids in settings where CSEC took place. If payment is not provided “the 
merchandise is taken: girls and women.” Non-governmental experts agreed that 
they have evidence of cases of girls and teenagers who managed to escape from 
sexual exploitation, sought help from public authorities, and then had these same 
authorities take them back to their exploiters. The testimony of an expert, the co-
ordinator of the United against Trafficking Commission, illustrated this point with 
the case of a girl who was being sexually exploited in a truck park.  
“Drivers would stop, have sex with her and continue on their way. Her par-
ents located her, and sought assistance from a law enforcement agency, 
and went together to her rescue. The girl entered the police patrol car [her 
parents were in a separated vehicle]. That was the last time they saw their 
daughter.”  
 “To whom do you turn? It has to be to institutions. How is that possible? 
It does not matter what crime we talk about, robbery, whatever … Where 
do you seek help? You [speaking about CSEC] need to be sure that you can 
seek help in a police station and that they will not force you to return to 
your abuser. Imagine … you manage to escape, you have been hit and 
raped, you reach a police officer, and he takes you back to your abuser.” 
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Institutional Violence by Omission 
The number of specialized agencies created after the General Trafficking Law 
that investigate and prosecute TIP crimes is small, and assistance provided to vic-
tims of CSEC is likely to be delivered using protocols intended for other types of 
crimes. The 2012 law confers on the State the responsibility for protecting and as-
sisting victims. As of March 2015, there was only one public federally funded high 
security public shelter managed by FEVIMTRA (The Special Federal Attorney’s Of-
fice for Violence against Women Crimes and Trafficking) for approximately 50 fe-
male victims of all forms of violence. The State of Puebla opened in 2015 the first 
public-private shelter for TIP victims, funded by both the State and private organ-
izations (U.S. Department of State, 2016). This situation contravenes the Traffick-
ing General Law because the states and the Federation are required to build and 
manage shelters for victims of TIP in order to assist them until they are fully re-
covered. 
The resources and capacity of the federally funded shelter are so limited that 
victims of TIP tend to be sent to other institutions. Public resources allocated to 
provide assistance to violence against women and TIP victims have decreased over 
time. The Special Federal Attorney’s Office for Violence against Women Crimes 
and Trafficking (FEVIMTRA) used to have three specialized centers providing 
comprehensive assistance to victims in the Federal District, Chihuahua and Chia-
pas. With the creation in 2011 of the Social Attorney’s Office for Crime Victims 
(PROVICTIMA) and its later transformation into the Executive Commission for 
the Assistance of Victims (CEAV) in 2012, the three centers were transferred to its 
control. They not only offer assistance to TIP victims, but also to victims of other 
crimes. At the State level, victims of CSEC and TIP are often sent to shelters for 
vulnerable children and female victims of violence, mostly domestic violence vic-
tims. According to data provided by the Mexican Government reported by Acharya 
(2017), there are 316 public agencies providing services to TIP victims and 31 not-
for-profit managed institutions nationwide. Only 59 of them offer short- and long-
term shelter to victims of TIP. However, they tend not to provide exclusive services 
to TIP and CSEC victims and the number of assisted victims is unknown (U.S. De-
partment of State, 2016). The coordination between governmental and non-gov-
ernmental efforts to provide comprehensive services to victims is weak. 
Despite these efforts, the 2015 Human Trafficking Report ranked Mexico as a 
Tier 2 country because the Mexican government does not fully comply with mini-
mum standards for the elimination of trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2016). 
This report recommends that the Mexican government increase resources to pro-
vide specialized services and protection to victims, as well as to strengthen inves-
tigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses.  
The general coordinator of the United Against Trafficking Commission argues 
that the lack of specialized institutions providing services for trafficked persons, 
such as shelters, is associated with the inaction of law enforcement agencies. These 
agencies do not rescue victims because there are no specialized institutions to as-
sist them: “Some states [authorities] say: ‘Ok, I’ll rescue them [the victims]. But 
where do I take them?’” This is likely to start a vicious cycle, since shelters are not 
built because there are no victims to assist. The State, therefore, contributes to the 
CSEC by omission of services through inadequate public policies or the lack of re-
sponse to institutional violence.  
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There is no public guidance or control regarding not-for-profit shelters. Ac-
cording to the experts, shelters are overwhelmed and do not have enough resources 
to assist all victims. The general coordinator of the United Against Trafficking 
Commission asserted that some legislators are working on establishing rules, but 
he finds the idea of NGOs being regulated by the State, which carries the responsi-
bility of providing such assistance, disturbing.  
The lack of regulation of these nonprofit organizations and the absence of pro-
tocols for providing assistance to victims may result in poor-quality services and 
victims’ re-victimization. While one of the authors was conducting an interview, 
the interviewee asked a victim of CSEC to join in the conversation and talk about 
her experience of being sexually exploited, without even asking if she was willing 
to do so. The conversation took place in a hostile and uncomfortable environment 
for the adolescent. In that context, to encourage a victim to talk about the abuses 
she suffered means re-victimizing her. The expert said this about the girl who 
shared her testimony: 
"And what’s more worrying is that she liked both drugs and going to bars, 
because she felt important. And she liked having sex. In fact, she now tries 
to provoke it. (…) It is not to say that an event such as rape could not 
awaken something inside you [implying that she liked it].”  
From this passage it could be inferred that he believes that victims of CSEC 
might enjoy being raped. This not only nullifies the abuse, but it also justifies it. 
Thus, while “enjoying being raped,” the victim “accepts being sexually assaulted,” 
and therefore, is not a victim anymore. Similarly, the file of one of the victims of 
CSEC recorded a two-year-long job. This job referred to CSEC. Classifying system-
atic sexual exploitation as a job, means keeping the abuse unseen, and raises ques-
tions regarding the training of those providing assistance to victims. 
Prevention Efforts  
In the experts’ views, most governmental efforts regarding CSEC and TIP are 
focused on prevention rather than assistance and eradication. This is explained by 
the fact that assistance entails higher costs than prevention. According to their tes-
timonies, prevention efforts are centered on educational strategies promoting 
awareness and identification of the problem, as well as dissemination of infor-
mation about human rights rather than actually tackling the causes of the problem. 
An example of an initiative targeting all social groups is Blue Heart, a U.N.-pro-
moted campaign adopted by the Mexican federal government in 2010. Similarly, 
in 2011 the Mexican Youth Institute launched a campaign addressed to children 
and adolescents in order to educate them about TIP. It consisted of posters and 
brochures and its slogan was “To play with puppets is fun, to play with persons is 
not… It is trafficking.” Some of these prevention actions were implemented in 
schools and were therefore limited to those who attend school. Experts agreed that 
prevention actions carried out by the Mexican State are limited and disconnected. 
Most of the preventative actions are carried out by national and international 
NGOs working on sexual trafficking in Mexico: the United Nations Children´s 
Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children, End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography 
and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT), Coalition Against Traf-
ficking in Women—Latin America and the Caribbean (CATWLAC), Child Develop-
ment Areas (Espacios de Desarrollo Infantil, A.C.), Common Childhood (Infancia 
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Común A.C), Infantia Foundation, Casa Alianza, Your Voice: Alliance Against Hu-
man trafficking in Mexico (Tu Voz: Alianza contra la Trata de Personas en México), 
and Without Trafficking (Sin Trata).  
Not-for-profit organizations also promote prevention. According to the Citi-
zens’ Observatory for Trafficking and Exploitation of Persons (Observatorio Ciu-
dadano de Tráfico y Trata de Personas) and the Secretaría de Gobernación – De-
partment of State, as of January 2017 there were 24 non-profit organizations and 
foundations addressing TIP and exploitation of persons;4 these organizations or-
ganize direct prevention campaigns in high-risk communities, and sponsor train-
ing in TIP and CSE.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article addresses CSEC as a form of sexual violence against children, the 
prevalence of which in Mexico is unknown. CSEC exists because consumers de-
mand it, traffickers offer it, others facilitate it, and the majority of society allows it. 
In Mexico, the social representation of exploiters tends to be simplified to be male 
traffickers who belong to big criminal networks. This small research study chal-
lenges this assumption by examining the life stories of 10 children and adolescents, 
sheltered in Casa Libertad, who experienced CSEC. The life stories of these girls 
might not be representative of all the girls experiencing CSEC, but reveal that they 
were exploited by both males and females and their exploitation was possible be-
cause families and their inner circle are accomplices. This finding supports previ-
ous research (Scoppetta Díaz & Rodríguez Cruz, 2006). Some direct exploiters, in 
two out of 10 cases, belonged to trafficking networks composed by members of the 
same family. The existence of more or less extensive underground networks that 
promote and perpetrate the abuse identified in previous research did not emerge 
from the reconstructed life histories or the expert interviews (Chin & Finckenauer, 
2011; Territo & Kirkham, 2010; Williamson & Prior, 2009). The majority of cases 
called into question existing stereotypes of modes of recruitment and management 
through exploiters’ trickery, seduction, captivity, and violence, thus confirming 
previous research (Marcus et al., 2012). 
In addition to direct exploiters, there are several other actors involved in the 
sexual exploitation of girls and adolescents. As found in previous research, for 
some, complicity involves action, while for others, it involves omission (Muñoz-
Echeverri et al., 2016). International legislation focuses mainly on traffickers and 
victims, leaving aside sex buyers and those who facilitate exploitation. This omis-
sion also occurs in Mexico, where sex buyers are punished only if they know that 
the victim is the object of exploitation, which turns out to be difficult to prove. Ig-
noring sex buyers as exploiters probably explains the failure to recognize that 
CSEC without a direct exploiter is a form of commercial exploitation of children, 
since it is believed that there is no victim without a victimizer. Not recognizing vic-
tims of CSEC without a direct exploiter can lead to biased interpretations of the 
                                                        
4 These organizations’ efforts are focused on three main areas: a) prevention through education and 
direct intervention in high risk communities; b) generation and diffusion of data; and c) provision 
of services for victims.  Information available at http://ccceh.org.mx/traficoytratadepersonas/in-
dex.php/redes-de-apoyo/ (last accessed March 14, 2017). 
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problem, such as conceptualizing CSEC as voluntary and dismissing the role 
played by individuals profiting from the child’s exploitation.  
The narrow definition of exploiters is reflected in the design of public policies; 
hence according to experts’ views, preventive campaigns tend to be focused on vic-
tims rather than exploiters and sex buyers. Girls and adolescents are taught to pro-
tect themselves from exploiters, to identify risk situations, and to seek help from 
public authorities. However, campaigns should also raise awareness in boys, male 
teenagers, and adults about the violence that traffickers, exploiters, sex buyers and 
others perpetrate on victims of CSEC. In order to prevent the problem, public in-
terventions need to address some of the factors associated with CSEC, such as pov-
erty, and the occurrence of other forms of victimization linked to CSEC such as 
CSA and parental neglect (see Meshkovska et al., 2015).  
This research also illustrates the disconnection between the formal protection 
for victims of TIP in the law and the actual protection offered through public poli-
cies and law-enforcement agencies. Public resources allocated for assistance and 
prevention are scarce; in 2011, the federal government spent around 247 million 
of pesos (approximately $12.3 million dollars as of March 2017) on TIP prevention 
and assistance actions (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2013). Never-
theless, only one third of the States in Mexico have a special unit in the State At-
torney’s Office to prosecute TIP and provide victims with comprehensive services 
provided by social workers, psychologists, doctors and legal consultants. In addi-
tion, there is only one publicly funded specialized shelter for victims of sex traffick-
ing, and attention to victims is generally left to a few not-for-profit organizations. 
The scarcity of public shelters and the lack of regulation and protocols regarding 
shelters exemplify the State’s institutional violence by omission toward TIP vic-
tims. Moreover, as suggested by key informants the lack of shelters is likely to start 
a vicious cycle, since shelters are not built because there are no victims to assist. 
The State, therefore, contributes to the CSEC by omission since inadequate public 
policies or the complete lack thereof results in institutional violence.  
The Mexican State is obligated to guarantee children’s rights and to protect 
them from sexual exploitation. Some governmental prevention efforts that target 
female children and adolescents are implemented in schools and are therefore lim-
ited to those who attend. Three of the Casa Libertad’s girls, Tina, Margarita and 
Regina, could not have benefited from school-based prevention efforts since they 
were illiterate and never went to school. According to the 2010 Mexican census, 
only 88% of the children and adolescents from 5 to 17 years old go school (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2010). The rationale behind these prevention 
efforts seems to be that if children and adolescents could be taught about the dan-
gers of TIP and CSE, they would be able to identify CSEC situations and they would 
avoid them. Similarly, if the public, including direct or indirect exploiters, received 
similar information, they would presumably protect children from CSEC. 
In experts’ views, however, corruption, abuse of power, and impunity among 
public authorities allow the existence of CSEC. Some public authorities also play a 
prominent role as sex buyers, therefore becoming direct exploiters.  
This research offers a methodological approach to the study of hidden popula-
tions such as institutionalized victims of CSEC by reconstructing their life stories 
by using several data sources. The results are limited due to incomplete institu-
tional information in databases and files and the limitations of participant obser-
vation. Though valuable information emerged from these institutionalized cases in 
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Casa Libertad, the results cannot be extrapolated to all victims of CSEC because 
institutionalized individuals are a nonrandom sample of the hidden population 
(Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004). They do, however, illustrate the need to adopt 
broader non-stereotypical definitions of exploiters, and to expand the understand-
ing of contexts in which CSEC occurs.  
This research underscores the relevance of studying the phenomenon of CSEC 
regardless of whether there is a direct exploiter or not. Despite the absence of a 
direct exploiter, children and adolescents engage in prostitution in a context of so-
cial inequality and vulnerability, where different actors take part in victimization 
and benefit with their exploitation. The Mexican State needs to further its efforts 
to effectively prevent TIP and CSEC and to protect its victims, not only by enacting 
legislation but also by allocating resources to design and implement public policies 
that address the roots of the problem, and by considering the State itself as part of 
the problem.  
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